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INTRODUCTION—THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT
AND ITS CHANGE

T

ullius Cicero, followed by Augustin and Thomas Aquinas, in respect of
the legality of war (bellum justum), discussed the concept of proportionality.
This concept was, in the same context, developed and further defined by
Hugo Grotius. 1 He argued that there were six considerations to take before
one could engage in a just war. These were just cause, rightful intention,
proper authority and public declaration of war, necessity (war as the last resort), probability of success, and the proportionality of the response to an
aggression (proportionality in the narrow sense). 2 Grotius added that not
only resorting to war was dominated by the concept of proportionality but
also the conduct of war itself. This approach prevailed.
Traditionally, the principle of proportionality is defined as limiting State
action to rational and reasonable means with the view to achieve a goal permissible under international law, without unduly encroaching on protected
rights of another State or States or individuals. The principle applies to the
planning, as well as the implementation, of State activities.
The application of the principle of proportionality is common in national
constitutional and administrative law. A vast national jurisprudence exists in
this regard. Due to the plurality of approaches in the various national legal
systems, it is hardly possible though to draw any sustainable conclusions
from national experiences in the context dealt with in this contribution.
In the following essay, after a brief account of the historical development
of the principle of proportionality and an analysis of the relevant provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it will
be considered whether the principle only limits the competences of States—
as traditionally envisioned—or even enlarges them so as to meet community
interests. It should be stated at the outset that UNCLOS does not refer explicitly to proportionality—the term does not appear in the text. However,
there are several provisions in UNCLOS that require an acting State, when
planning or taking action, to weigh its rights and interests against equally

1. See Emily Crawford, Proportionality, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERLAW (last updated May, 2011), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1459?rskey=2XQ0Fc&result=5&prd=MPIL;
Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview, 10 DARTMOUTH
LAW JOURNAL 1, 3–5 (2012).
2. HUGONIS GROTII, DE IURE BELLI AC PACIS, Ch. 2 (1670).
NATIONAL
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guaranteed interests and rights of other States. Generically speaking, this is
what the principle of proportionality requires.
II.

FIRST APPLICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CAROLINE
INCIDENT AND THE NAULILAA CASE

The well-known Caroline incident constituted an act of self-defense in 1837
in a war between Canada and the United Kingdom. 3 The Canadian rebels
received support from the United States via the steamer Caroline. Since the
United States was unable or unwilling to halt this support a British contingent entered the United States, set the vessel on fire, and sent it over the
Niagara Falls. The U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, requested that
the UK government demonstrate that the actions had fulfilled the requirements of self-defense. Additionally, Webster stated that acts of self-defense
must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it. That means he
distinguished, as did Hugo Grotius, between the justification of the act and
its conduct, both to be guided by the principle of proportionality.
The Naulilaa case also resulted from an armed conflict—actually an
armed reprisal. 4 At the beginning of the First World War, three members of
a German delegation—two of them officers—were killed by members of the
Portuguese colonial armed forces when Portugal still was a neutral power in
the war. In response to this killing German colonial armed forces from the
German South-West Africa colony (today Namibia) destroyed several Portuguese forts (including Naulilaa) and caused severe casualties and damage
to property. On the basis of the Versailles Treaty, Portugal successfully invoked the international responsibility of Germany. An arbitral procedure
was established. The Arbitral Tribunal held that the German reprisal as a
response to the killing of three Germans was excessive and out of proportion
to the act that had motivated them.
There is, from the perspective of the principle of proportionality, a clear
difference between the Caroline incident and the Naulilaa case. While the
principle of proportionality was referred to as a justification for an act of
self-defense (and affirmed) in the Naulilaa case, the arbitral tribunal criticized
the way the armed reprisal had been carried out, ruling that the actions undertaken by German military forces had been disproportional to the Portuguese attack.
3. See R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and MacLoed Cases, 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTER82 (1938).
4. Naulilaa Arbitration (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, 1028 (1928).

NATIONAL LAW
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A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PRINCIPLE

The principle of proportionality was incorporated into several branches of
public international law, in particular in the rules concerning self-defense and
in international humanitarian law. The rules concerning self-defense were
particularly influenced by the Caroline incident—to be more precise, by the
demands and statements of Secretary of State Webster.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in the Nicaragua case that
Article 51 of the UN Charter “does not contain any specific rule whereby
self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to an
armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law.” 5 In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court repeated this ruling and added:
“This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever
means of force employed.” 6 In the Case Concerning Oil Platforms 7 the ICJ stated
that the United States must show that “its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attack made on it, and that the platforms were a legitimate military target open to attack in the exercise of self-defence.” 8 Since
“proportionality” is considered the “quintessential factor” of self-defense 9
some clarification is needed to determine what this term means—or rather
what it does not mean. It does not mean a precise equation of causalities and
damage. However, there must be some symmetry or approximation between
the legal counter-measure and the original unlawful use of force. 10
The principle of proportionality—understood as the principle that the
losses resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to
the expected military advantage—is enshrined in the Protocol (I) Additional

5. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27).
6. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 41 (July 8).
7. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6).
8. For criticism that the ICJ was mixing jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations, see
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 183–84 (6th ed. 2017).
9. Id. at 267–68. It does not mean a precise equation of causalities and damage. However, there must be some symmetry or approximation between the legal counter-measure
and the initial illegal act.
10. Id. at 268 (referring to the Oil Platforms case, 2003 I.C.J. at 198–99).
679
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to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I). 11 Although the principle is not
the subject of a specific article in AP I it is reflected in two provisions. Article
51(5)(b) prohibits an attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated. In nearly identical words, Article 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b)
require precautionary measures to be taken to avoid collateral damage that
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. 12 Thus, the principle of proportionality balances the demands of
military necessity and humanity. 13 This has been further exemplified in the
rules of the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR)
Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 14 summarizing in Rule 14 the principle of proportionality: “An attack that may be
expected to cause collateral damage which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited.” 15
The principle of proportionality equally plays a role under World Trade
Organization (WTO) law. For example, Article 20(a), (b), and (d) of the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides that States may
pursue certain policies that are legitimate as exceptions to the free trade regime if they meet certain qualifications, the existence of which have to be
demonstrated by the State concerned. 16 One of them is the necessity test.
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3.
12. As to the legislative history of these central provisions, see MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL.,
NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 309–10, 360–61 (1982) (stating that Article
51 contains “a codification in fairly concrete terms of the principle of proportionality”).
13. Concerning the application of the principle, see UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 25 (2004).
14. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE r. 35(a), (b), (c) (2013).
15. Id. r. 14.
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 20(a), (b), (d), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.A11, 55 U.N.T.S 194 (“(a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health; . . . (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of
Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the
prevention of deceptive practices”).
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The WTO Appellate Body report Brazil-Retreaded Tyres has contributed to the
understanding of the necessity test. 17 It is first necessary to identify the objective pursued by the measures in question and to establish whether such
objective falls under subsections a, b, or d of Article 20 of the 1947 GATT.
It then has to be established whether the measure contributes to the achievement of this objective. The final step is the “weighing and balancing of the
interests involved.” 18 The Report stated:
178. We begin our analysis by recalling that, in order to determine
whether a measure is “necessary” within the meaning of Article XX(b) of
the GATT 1994, a panel must consider the relevant factors, particularly the
importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution
to the achievement of the measure’s objective, and its trade restrictiveness.
If this analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary,
this result must be confirmed by comparing the measure with possible alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent
contribution to the achievement of the objective. This comparison should
be carried out in the light of the importance of the interests or values at
stake. It is through this process that a panel determines whether a measure
is necessary. 19

The proportionality principle also plays a role in respect of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom and European
Union law as well as in other branches of international law if one considers
the mechanism applied rather than using the term “proportionality.”
IV.

THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE UNDER UNCLOS

A. Applications Under Various Terms
The issue of proportionality constitutes a structural element in UNCLOS,
although the term is not used explicitly. The principle dominates the delimitation of competing national maritime zones—the EEZ and the continental
shelf. In the delimitation cases decided by the ICJ, the International Tribunal
17. WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R ¶¶ 133–83 (Dec. 3, 2007).
18. For further details, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, ARTICLE XX, in WTO: TRADE IN GOODS
455, 459–62 ¶¶ 15–18 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2011).
19. WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 17, ¶ 178 (footnotes omitted) (the
analysis of the WTO panel was shared by the Appellate Body at ¶¶ 182–83).
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for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and arbitral tribunals, frequently the issue
was of relevance as to whether the size of the zones in question had to be in
proportion to the length of the relevant coastlines.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf case the ICJ stated that one of the factors
considered was “the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality,
which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles
ought to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast.” 20 This was the
logical consequence of the doctrine developed by the ICJ in the case that
“the land dominates the sea.”
In the Black Sea case, the ICJ developed a procedure involving several
steps that clarified the meaning of the principle of proportionality in the context used. 21 This judgment consolidates the existing jurisprudence concerning the delimitation of maritime spaces. In the first step, the Court identifies
the maritime area under dispute by identifying the “relevant coasts”—as well
as the length of each coast. The projection of the coasts to the sea establishes
the area under dispute. The length of the relevant coasts establishes the basis
of a “disproportionality test” for the final assessment of the delimitation
elaborated in steps two and three (on the basis of an equidistance line possibly adjusted by taking into account relevant circumstances). An alternative
means is the angle-bisector line, which has been argued frequently but
adopted less than the equidistance line. The equidistance procedure has been
adopted by ITLOS in the case Bangladesh/Myanmar22 and by the arbitral tribunal Bangladesh v. India. 23 Subsequent jurisprudence, such as in the cases of
Côte d’Ivoire v. Ghana, 24 Somalia v. Kenya, 25and Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 26 follow
20. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
3, 54 (Feb. 20); see also Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb.
24); Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3).
21. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61
(Feb. 3).
22. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the
Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep.
2012, at 4.
23. Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl. v. India), Award of July 7,
2014, https://pca-cpa.org/ru/cases/18.
24. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte
d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, ITLOS Rep. 2017, at 4.
25. Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya), Judgment, 2021 I.C.J.
(Oct. 12) (for discussion concerning the disproportionality test, see ¶¶ 175–77).
26. Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 139, ¶¶ 107–66; 177–204 (Feb 2).
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the same approach. In the disproportionality test concerning the dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case, ITLOS stated:
497. The Tribunal will now check whether the adjusted equidistance
line has caused a significant disproportion by reference to the ratio of the
length of the coastlines of the Parties and the ratio of the relevant maritime
area allocated to each Party.
498. The length of the relevant coast of Bangladesh . . . is 413 kilometres, while that of Myanmar . . . is 587 kilometres. The ratio of the length
of the relevant coasts of the Parties is 1:1.42 in favour of Myanmar.
499. The Tribunal notes that its adjusted delimitation line . . . allocates
approximately 111,631 square kilometres of the relevant area to Bangladesh
and approximately 171,832 square kilometres to Myanmar. The ratio of the
allocated areas is approximately 1:1.54 in favour of Myanmar. The Tribunal
finds that this ratio does not lead to any significant disproportion in the
allocation of maritime areas to the Parties relative to the respective lengths
of their coasts that would require the shifting of the adjusted equidistance
line in order to ensure an equitable solution.27

The way of reasoning of the courts or tribunals in this respect is similar.
It is to be noted that this is a negative test. The court or tribunal is not called
upon to establish proportionality but rather whether the demands of the
principle of proportionality have been violated. In that respect, the approach
developed by the ICJ differs positively from the demands of AP I. There,
the reference is to proportionality, albeit the understanding that an exact
proportionality cannot be achieved. This opens the interpretation of Articles
51 and 52 of AP I to subjective considerations whereas the delimitation of
maritime spaces is—at least on its face—based upon objective criteria.
Another example for a constructive function of the proportionality principle is to be found in Article 47(1) of UNCLOS. It defines the ratio between
land and water that qualifies an archipelago to be an archipelagic State. Different from previous examples where the request to honor the principle of
proportionality is addressing a particular State, here the proportionality is
referring to a factual situation that is a central precondition for the qualification of a State as an archipelagic State. Article 47 of UNCLOS has far-reaching practical consequences. It ensures that only mid-ocean archipelagos—
such as the Philippines, Fiji, and Indonesia—qualify as archipelagic States,

27. Bangl. v. Myan., supra note 22, ¶¶ 497–99.
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whereas “continental archipelagos”—such as Hawaii, the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago, and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea—do not.
A weighing of contradicting rights and interests in the meaning of the
proportionality principle is required under Articles 56 and 58 of UNCLOS,
respectively. According to Article 56(2) the coastal State in exercising its
rights and duties in its exclusive economic zone shall “have due regard to the
rights and duties of other States.” The counterpart to that norm is Article
58(3), which requires: “In exercising their rights and performing their duties
under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone . . . . States shall have
due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.” That means both
States have the obligation to organize their activities taking into account the
proportionality principle. This bilateral reciprocal obligation is supplemented
by Article 59, UNCLOS. This provision covers the situation that competences in an exclusive economic zone are attributed neither to the coastal
State concerned nor to other States. The provision was meant to cover competences not anticipated when the Convention was adopted. This norm may,
however, equally be referred to if there is a disagreement between the coastal
State concerned and another State, whether a certain established competence
is attributed to either of them. 28 This norm directs the parties involved to
seek a solution on the basis of equity by adding: “and in the light of all the
relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the
interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as
a whole.” 29 This clearly involves a weighing process typical for the proportionality principle. However, there has been an element added in the examples presented so far: the reference to community interests. This acknowledges that the Convention on the Law of the Sea is more than a network of
bilateral and reciprocal rights and duties but also an instrument preserving
the interests of the international community of States in the sea.
The principle of proportionality also is at the roots of the regime established by Articles 150 and 151 of UNCLOS concerning the production policy to be pursued by deep seabed mining. This rather complex regime is
meant to balance the interests of the States (and industry) in deep seabed
mining and the interest of the producers of the same minerals on land. Land
producers—not only developing countries—were fearful that an unlimited
production of minerals from the deep seabed (the “Area”) would lead to an
28. For further details, see Alexander Proelss, Article 59, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 458, ¶¶ 1, 4 (Alexander Proelss ed., 2017).
29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 59, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
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overproduction and consequently a destabilization of prices of the commodity concerned. To accommodate their view, it was decided to limit production from the deep seabed for an interim period so that the additional resources from the seabed would be phased into the international commodity
system gradually. Seeing the international market on mineral commodities as
a unity, it becomes evident that each participant will have to reduce its share
proportionally to allow others to participate in this market and to benefit
therefrom.
Another prime example for the accommodation of potentially conflicting interests is the interplay between Articles 192 and 193 of UNCLOS. Article 192 provides that States (not limited to States parties) have an obligation
to protect and to preserve the marine environment. The way this obligation
is formulated indicates that it was seen as covered by customary international
law. However, Article 192 is balanced by the principle in Article 193 30—
equally belonging to customary international law—that “States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental
policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and to preserve the
marine environment.” It is evident that the States concerned must weigh and
assess their various options concerning the economic use of the oceans.
They have to take into consideration their own economic interests, limited
by their national environmental law, but also the interests of other users of
the oceans as well as the demands of the international community. In one of
its early cases, ITLOS had to deal with this in a provisional measure—the
Southern Bluefin Tuna cases. 31 The tribunal ruled: “Considering that, although
the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific evidence presented by
the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to

30. Article 193 was evidently inspired by the wording of the Declaration of the U.N.
General Assembly in G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962). The two most relevant paragraphs read:
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the
well-being of the people of the State concerned.
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in conformity with the
rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities.

31. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z./Japan; Austl./Japan), Case Nos. 3 & 4, Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, ITLOS Rep. 1999, at 280.
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preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the
southern bluefin tuna stock.” 32
The tribunal had to weigh the interest of Japan in the fishing of southern
bluefin tuna, in particular since the ordinary season for fishing was imminent,
as well as the interests of New Zealand and Australia in fishing, and the interest of the international community in the preservation of that stock. The
arguments of the latter were advanced indirectly by New Zealand and Australia. The decision of the tribunal was rendered complicated by the lack of
reliable data on the fish stock in question. Therefore, the tribunal had to have
recourse to the precautionary approach. 33 The tribunal obliged Japan to deduct the catches made under the scientific program concerning fishing
southern bluefin tuna from the annual fishing quota of Japan. Japan fully
complied and there was no fishing under the quota system in the year concerned.
Finally, it is appropriate to refer to Article 73 in connection with Article
292 of UNCLOS. Neither of these two provisions refers to the principle of
proportionality, but Article 73 contains a reference to necessity. According
to Article 73, coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve, and manage living resources in their exclusive
economic zones, take certain measures as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the applicable national law. This includes the arrest of the vessel
and the crew concerned. The flag State, or an entity on its behalf, may ask
for the release of the vessel, obliging it to return for the criminal or administrative procedure to follow. To guarantee the return, the coastal State may
request a reasonable bond. Such a decision may be challenged by the flag
State of the vessel according to Article 292 (prompt release procedure). In
the cases decided upon by ITLOS 34 two issues were always of relevance,
namely whether the measures taken by the coastal State were “necessary”
and whether the bond requested was “reasonable.” Both issues require an
assessment of the coastal State’s measures taken from the point of view of
proportionality. ITLOS, in the Hoshinmaru case, 35 specified what it considered a reasonable bond. The case was a particular one. The Hoshinmaru, a
32. Id. ¶ 80.
33. See id. at 302 (Joint Declaration of Wolfrum, V.P., Caminos, J., Rangel, J., Yankov,
J., Anderson, J., and Eriksson, J.); but see id. at 316–19 (Separate Opinion of Treves, J.).
34. Only ITLOS has jurisdiction to decide in such a procedure unless the parties agree
otherwise.
35. “Hoshinmaru” (Japan v. Russ.), Prompt Release, Case No. 14, Judgment of Aug. 6,
2007, ITLOS Reports 2005–2007, at 18.
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Japanese fishing vessel, had been fishing in the Russian EEZ under a valid
license. When inspected by the Russian authorities it turned out that it had
misreported its catches, although its actual catches were covered by its license. The Russian authorities imposed the maximum fine upon the captain
as well as on the owner of the vessel and the vessel was confiscated. The
tribunal questioned whether the bond set by the Russian authorities was reasonable while resorting to all prompt release cases decided by the tribunal so
far. Therefore, the reasoning of the tribunal constitutes a summing up of the
tribunal’s jurisprudence. The tribunal stated:
82. The Tribunal has expressed its views on the reasonableness of the
bond in a number of its judgments. In the “Camouco” Case it stated: “the
Tribunal considers that a number of factors are relevant in an assessment
of the reasonableness of bonds or other financial security. They include the
gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties imposed or imposable under
the laws of the detaining State, the value of the detained vessel and of the
cargo seized, the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining State and
its form” (ITLOS Reports 2000, p. 10, at p. 31, para. 67). In the “Monte Confurco” Case it added that: “This is by no means a complete list of factors.
Nor does the Tribunal intend to lay down rigid rules as to the exact weight
to be attached to each of them” (ITLOS Reports 2000, p. 86, at p. 109, para.
76). In the “Volga” Case it stated that: “In assessing the reasonableness of
the bond or other security, due account must be taken of the terms of the
bond or security set by the detaining State, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case” (ITLOS Reports 2002, p. 10, at p. 32, para.
65). In the “Juno Trader” Case, the Tribunal further declared that: “The assessment of the relevant factors must be an objective one, taking into account all information provided to the Tribunal by the parties” (ITLOS Reports 2004, p. 17, at p. 41, para. 85). 36

After having summarized its jurisprudence, the tribunal reiterated more
clearly than before the underlying philosophy of assessing whether the bond
requested by the coastal State was reasonable.
88. The Tribunal is of the view that the amount of a bond should be
proportionate to the gravity of the alleged offences. Article 292 of the Convention is designed to ensure that the coastal State, when fixing the bond,

36. Id. ¶ 82.
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adheres to the requirement stipulated in article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention, namely that the bond it fixes is reasonable in light of the assessment of relevant factors.
...
94. For these reasons and in view of the circumstances of the case, the
Tribunal finds that the Respondent has not complied with article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention, that the Application is well-founded, and that,
consequently, the Russian Federation must release promptly the Hoshinmaru, including the catch on board and its crew in accordance with paragraph 102. 37

It is telling that the Hoshinmaru case, together with the Tomimaru case 38
submitted the same day, were the last cases that have been decided by ITLOS
under the prompt release procedure.
B. A Means of Limiting Actions
In the majority of cases reported, the proportionality principle meant that
actions undertaken by a particular State were limited with the view to respect
concrete rights and interests of another State or particular persons or objects.
This is clearly expressed in Articles 51 and 57 of AP I. Both provisions spell
out the reasons for the limitation of a planned military action. The acting
State, if it has accepted the magnitude of the risk of its planned activity, only
has the option to modify its planned action. This can be done in various
ways. The State concerned may decrease the intensity of the military activity
planned, introduce additional precautionary measures, or alter its military action altogether. What is important is that the acting State has to take into
account established facts such as the existence of protected objects (such as
hospitals, cultural property, the presence of civilians, etc.). This provides objective criteria on the basis of which, in spite of the many uncertainties that
will prevail, it will be possible to check retrospectively whether the military
action undertaken was proportionate.
The mechanism in respect of Articles 56 and 58, UNCLOS, is different.
In this situation, it is unclear which rights and interests are at stake and the
State planning to act will have to assess the relevance of its rights and interests as well as the ones of other States. That means that the question whether
37. Id. ¶¶ 88, 94.
38. “Tomimaru” (Japan v. Russ.), Prompt Release, Case No. 15, Judgment of Aug. 6,
2007, ITLOS Reports 2005–2007, at 74.
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there are conflicting interests and rights and what relevance the claimed
rights and interests have is to be decided on a wholly subjective basis. This
is of relevance for international courts or tribunals if they are called upon to
decide on a dispute between a coastal State and another State on the basis of
Articles 56 and 58 of the Convention. Anyhow, also in this constellation the
principle of proportionality requires States to limit exercising their rights and
interests with the view to give due regard to the rights and interests of the
other side.
A different approach in the balancing of the various interests is pursued
by Articles 150 and 151, UNCLOS, between the producers of the relevant
resources at land and the ones at sea at the level of States. Article 151(4)
establishes a scheme that limits the production of nickel and thus the production of resources from the deep seabed for an interim period. 39 The proportionality principle—that is the balance between the interests involved—
has been made automatic on the basis of objective data.
C. An Additional Element in the Exercise of Powers—Margin of Appreciation
State decisions balancing the interests of the States involved under Article
56 and 58, UNCLOS, as well as under AP I, provide the States involved with
a margin of appreciation concerning the consequential risks of the planned
military activities. This margin of appreciation applies to the following elements of the decisions to be taken by the State planning military activities in
question under AP I: First, the military objective pursued, its scope, and, in
particular, its relevance; second, the existence of protected personnel or
buildings in the area and the demands for their protection (for example, are
these objects or personnel being used as “human shields”?); and third, the
potential impact of the military acts. There is no doubt that each of these
necessary decisions is to be taken on a hypothetical, and thus subjective, basis. The same is true for balancing the interests of the coastal State in its
exclusive economic zone (covered by Article 56) and other States undertaking activities in the exclusive economic zone of the former (covered by Article 58). The State concerned, be it the coastal State or the “other State,” has
to anticipate which interests or rights of the counterpart might be affected.
Again, this will have to be done on the basis of a hypothesis. The same situation prevails in respect of the necessity to balance resource activities and

39. See UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 151(7).
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the demands of the marine environment under Articles 192 and 193 of UNCLOS, respectively.
The situation is structurally different for a coastal State, which establishes
a regime concerning the implementation of its fisheries regime in its exclusive economic zone, including the stipulation of what is a reasonable bond.
A problem not really approached in international jurisprudence is
whether, in the case of a dispute, an international court or tribunal may replace the appreciation by the one of its own. This was the situation in the
Hoshinmaru case. 40 ITLOS did not seem to have any doubt that it was called
upon to ascertain the reasonableness of the bond as promulgated or requested. 41 On the basis of this limited judicial practice, no sustainable conclusion should be drawn. This is particularly true considering that Article
189, UNCLOS, limits the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber 42
with regard to the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary power. This
provision explicitly states that “the Seabed Disputes Chamber shall not pronounce itself on the question of whether any rules, regulations or procedures
of the Authority are in conformity with this Convention.” It would be
strange if the legislative acts of the International Seabed Authority would be
safe from judicial scrutiny whereas the national law of States would not be.
Finally, one should take into account that the disputes under UNCLOS, although politically very relevant, are less sovereignty oriented than military actions which will be scrutinized from the point of view of Articles 51 and 57
of AP I.
D. A Possible Means of Enlarging State Competences—The Impact of International
Community Interests
So far, the proportionality principle has been analyzed in the context of bilateral relations between States with the view to delimit the areas of competence between the States concerned. However, it is doubtful whether such
40. See “Hoshinmaru,” supra note 35, ¶ 88.
41. Judge Lucky in his separate opinion even stated that the Tribunal “would have to
weigh the gravity in the same manner as a national judge.” Id. at 55 (referring to his separate
opinion in the “Juno Trader” case, “Juno Trader” (St. Vincent v. Guinea-Bissau), Prompt
Release, Case No. 13, Judgment of Dec. 18, 2004, ITLOS Rep. 2004, at 17). Judge Yanai, in
a separate opinion in “Hoshinmaru,” supra note 35, at 61–63, emphasized that the low gravity
of the offence would have required a lower penalty.
42. The Seabed Disputes Chamber is an autonomous chamber of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea consisting of eleven judges from among the twenty-one
judges of the Tribunal. The Chamber has its own rules of procedure.
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an approach is still up-to-date. It is well established in recent international
law instruments and confirmed in academic writings that certain community
interests (or more vaguely concerning the beneficiary “common interests”)
exist, while references are equally made to “common concern.” To name
some prominent examples: the Global Compact for Migration 43— which is
“a non-legally binding” instrument; 44 also the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change; 45 the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in
those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 1994 (Desertification Convention); 46 the Convention on
Biological Diversity, 1992; 47 and the Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer, 48 including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987. 49 However, reference is not only made to
the interests or concerns of the international community in treaties focusing
on the protection of the environment but a similar approach is taken in the
context of the protection of human rights. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, refers to a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.” The ICJ stated in its Advisory Opinion on
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that States have no interest of their own in the object of the Convention,

43. G.A. Res. 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Dec.
19, 2018).
44. See id. pmbl. ¶ 7.
45. U.N. Climate Change, The Paris Agreement: What is the Paris Agreement?, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (last visited Oct.
4, 2022).
46. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, at pmbl. ¶ 2, June
17, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 01-215, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108 (stating, in the second preambular paragraph: “Reflecting the urgent concern of the international community, including States and
international organizations, about the adverse impacts of desertification and drought”).
47. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143.
48. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324. The Convention states in the third preambular paragraph
that “biological diversity is a common concern of humankind.” It is to be noted that this
treaty refers to the human being whereas other international treaties establish that they serve
the interest of the international community rather than refer to States.
49. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
T.I.A.S. 89-101, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29.
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but merely a common interest. 50 It is finally acknowledged that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is to be considered a regime, which, at least
in part, serves the interests of the international community.
Establishing a regime which is meant to serve community interests is not
necessarily driven merely by utilitarian considerations. 51 Such establishment
has a dogmatic basis. It is based upon the assumption that public international law has a particular role, namely that it should come into play for those
issues, which can only be managed effectively by a common effort of the
international community. The efforts to control and reduce climate change
are a typical example. Only common efforts will be able to stop or at least
reduce climate change. 52
There are three scenarios/reasons that may induce or call for the establishment of a regime based upon the principle of common interests. First,
on the basis of facts, if it is established that a particular issue has to be addressed and managed in the interest of a wider community and the efficiency
of such management depends upon the participation of a larger group. This
is particularly relevant for international environmental law, trade law, the international regime on the protection of health, etc. Second, a certain value is
accepted by the international community and its realization universally requires the participation of the international community. This is of particular
relevance for the international human rights regime. Third, common
spaces—spaces not under the territorial sovereignty of one State—require
common governance, thus ensuring that all members of the international
community can equally participate in the utilization of such spaces. 53
One of the earliest references of international jurisprudence to the existence of community interests may be seen in a dictum of the ICJ in its advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. 54 The Court stated that in such a Convention “[t]he Contracting Parties do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one
50. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
51. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION, ch. 1, ¶ 4 (1789).
52. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, pmbl., May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
53. The three scenarios belong dogmatically together; only the reasons for considering
them as regimes serving community interests differ; contra EDITH BROWN WEISS, ESTABLISHING NORMS IN A KALEIDOSCOPIC WORLD 169–71 (2018).
54. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, supra note 50.
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and all a common interest.” 55 This approach has been confirmed in the case
brought by the Gambia against Myanmar56 and it was honored by the ICJ in
its Order on Provisional Measures of January 23, 2020. 57
The ICJ briefly touched upon the acceptance of community interests in
respect of whaling, without, however, resolving it58—a missed opportunity.
It may be opportune to turn to that case to address the question raised here:
whether via the principle of proportionality it may be possible for States—
coastal ones or others—to integrate community interest in their own bundle
of interests when it comes to the weighing of interests as indicated above.
The dispute between Australia and Japan required an interpretation of
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). 59 The
object and purpose of this Convention are set out in its Preamble, which
indicates that the Convention pursues the purpose of ensuring the conservation of all species of whales while allowing for their sustainable exploitation. For example, the first preambular paragraph recognizes “the interest of
the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks.” Subsequent paragraphs confirm this approach. Important in the context dealt with here is the reference
to the “interest of nations,” which clearly indicates that the conservation and
protection of whales is in the interest of the international community. However, the Preamble also refers to the exploitation of whales. That means that
the object and purpose of the ICRW is a dual one. Amendments to the
Schedule, which specifies the management of whale stocks and recommendations by the International Whaling Commission, have shifted in their emphasis between the two facets of the object and purpose of the ICRW. In
their pleadings, Australia and New Zealand relied on an interpretation of the
55. Id. One may also refer to the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 185
(Apr. 11), in which it refers to the international community creating an entity possessing
objective international personality. Concerning the analysis of the jurisprudence of the ICJ
on this issue see ANDREAS L. PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT IM VÖLKERRECHT 364–66 (2001).
56. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178. In its application and request for provisional measures Gambia relied on Article 9 of the Genocide Convention.
57. Id. Order of Jan. 23, 2020, https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/178-20200123-ORD-02-00-EN.pdf.
58. See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan; N.Z. intervening), Judgment, 2014
I.C.J. 22 (Mar. 31).
59. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, T.I.A.S. 1849; 4 Bevans 248; 161 U.N.T.S. 74.
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ICRW emphasizing the object and purpose of the latter. They did not explicitly argue that they acted in the interest of the parties to the ICRW (since
they were divided) or of the international community.
However, could Australia and New Zealand have advanced such an argument? Or, to put it into different words, would it be sustainable if a State
used the proportionality principle to advance community interests with the
consequence that the State concerned would act as an agent of the international community? One has to distinguish between the procedural issue of
standing and the decision on the merits.
As far as standing is concerned, the ICJ in the Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case held in its judgment
of July 22, 2022:
107. All the States parties to the Genocide Convention thus have a
common interest to ensure the prevention, suppression and punishment of
genocide, by committing themselves to fulfilling the obligations contained
in the Convention. As the Court has affirmed, such a common interest
implies that the obligations in question are owed by any State party to all
the other States parties to the relevant convention; they are obligations erga
omnes partes, in the sense that each State party has an interest in compliance
with them in any given case. 60

This decision of the ICJ constitutes the intermediate culmination of a
series of decisions starting with its advisory opinion on the Genocide Convention. 61 The next step was the obiter dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, 62
where the Court distinguished between obligations owed to the international
community (erga omnes obligations) and those owed to individual States. This
obiter dictum is often said to have been the response to the criticism the
Court had attracted by its decision in the second phase of the South-West
60. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ¶ 107, July 22, 2022,
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/178-20220722-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
(citations omitted); see also Gam. v. Myan, supra note 57.
61. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, supra note 50.
62. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (New Application: 1962) (Belg. v.
Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); see Jean-Marc Thouvenin, La saisine de la CIJ
en cas de violation des règles fondamentales, in FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 319, 326 (C. Tomuschat &
Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006).
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Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa/Liberia v. South Africa), 63 where the Court
had stated that Ethiopia and Liberia respectively had no rights in their individual capacity 64 to call for the carrying out of the mandate. Instead, the
Court emphasized that the management of the mandate system was vested
in the League of Nations and individual States were restricted in participation
in the management through the organs of the League. A further step into
the direction that obligations towards the international community or a particular community entitles every member of such community to claim the
cessation of the alleged breach by another State party is the statement of the
ICJ in the dispute Question relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal). 65
All these rulings cover situations where the claiming State advanced a
claim serving the interest of the international community and where, accordingly, the question of standing had to be decided. There is another procedural situation, however, that may happen more frequently than these situations. In the other situation, a State claims before an international court or
tribunal that its own rights have been violated and it advances amongst the
relevant arguments that the responding State has violated community interests. In such a situation the standing of the claiming State should be beyond
doubt but it may be questioned whether such an argument is admissible. A
hypothetical example may illustrate the question. An archipelagic State suspends specific areas of its archipelagic waters to the innocent passage of foreign ships, invoking Article 52(2) of UNCLOS on the declared reason that
this was necessary for the protection of marine biological diversity. In a subsequent legal dispute with other States, the archipelagic State claims that the
63. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6,
19–22 et seq., ¶¶ 7–14 et seq. (July 18).
64. The ICJ distinguished between standing before the Court and the individual rights
of the two applicants to call for the carrying out of the mandate. This differentiation is being
emphasized by Giorgio Gaja, Claims Concerning Obligations Erga Omnes in the Jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MODERNIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 42 (R. Pisillo Mazzeschi & P. De Sena eds., 2018). Gaja further
states that if the respondent does not object to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the claimant
pursues community interest then the Court will decide the claim on the merits. Id. at 43.
65. Question relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 2012
I.C.J. 422, ¶ 69 (July 20) (“The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations
under the Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the
Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State
party. . . . It follows that any State party to the Convention may invoke the responsibility of
another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes . . . and to bring the failure to an end.”).
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closing of innocent passage is the result of the national process of weighing
the interests of the archipelagic State with the interests of other States. It was
competent to suspend innocent passage to give room to the relevant community interests set out in the Biodiversity Convention. 66 Such an argument
would not be sustainable since innocent passage may only be suspended if it
is “essential for the protection of [the archipelagic State’s] security. This excludes taking into account objectives other than security.
The situation is, however, different if the provision relied upon by a
coastal State, for example, only requires that the interests and rights of other
States may be taken into account. Here it may be argued that the coastal State
may invoke considerations of climate protection as community interests with
the consequence that the rights of other States in a foreign exclusive economic zone may be more limited than anticipated under Article 56, UNCLOS. Seen from this perspective, the principle of proportionality may become a mechanism to implement community interests and at the same time
strengthen the competences of States.
V.

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The principle of proportionality—although not always referred to as
such—constitutes an established principle in international law. It originated
from the deliberation on the just war; it still is part of the right of self-defense
but it also governs the ius in bello as far as the process of weighing between
military necessity and the protection of non-combatants or protected objects
is concerned. While the principle of proportionality is traditionally associated
with the law of war, it has permeated other parts of public international law,
particularly international trade law.
In all these situations, the principle of proportionality has a limiting effect for the acting State. A tendency seems to develop, though, that the development of community interest, particularly recognizable in international
environmental law, may result in broadening the competences of States. If
States act in implementing community interests they technically act as agents
of the international community. Acting as such they may include community
interests among such interests that they introduce into the weighing process
with countervailing interests of others. Therefore, one may argue that via a
proportionality procedure States may increase their competencies. Such a
66. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (the Preamble of the Convention emphasizes that the protection of biodiversity is “a common concern of humankind”).
696

Reconsidering the Application of Proportionality

Vol. 99

possibility should not be without limits. However, the development of such
new understanding of the proportionality principle has not yet matured.
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